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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
: . Case No. 
- v s - . 14004 
GUS WILLIAM SIMPSON, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
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w i t h o u t a j u r y on t h e 3 rd and 4 t h d a y s of December, 1974. On 
J a n u a r y 15 , 1975 , a p p e l l a n t was found g u i l t y of i l l e g a l p o s -
s e s s i o n o f a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e w i t h i n t e n t t o d i s t r i b u t e f o r 
v a l u e . On F e b r u a r y 19, 1975 , a p p e l l a n t was s e n t e n c e d f o r n o t 
more t h a n f i v e y e a r s in t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Responden t s e e k s a f f i r m a n c e of t h e lower c o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On t h e 15 th day of May, 1974, t h e a p p e l l a n t was p i l o t -
i ng a s m a l l s i n g l e e n g i n e a i r c r a f t t h a t l a n d e d on the B land ing 
C i t y A i r s t r i p i n San J u a n Coun ty , U t a h , a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 :30 
o ' c l o c k a .m . ( T r . 7 9 ) . F i n d i n g no one a v a i l a b l e t o r e f u e l t h e 
p l a n e , a p p e l l a n t t a x i e d i t t o t h e end of t h e a i r s t r i p t o w a i t 
u n t i l d a y l i g h t ( T r . 1 3 0 ) . 
The Manager of t h e a i r p o r t , a f t e r o b s e r v i n g t h e 
movement o f t h e a i r p l a n e and t h e c o n d u c t o f a p p e l l a n t a t such 
a l a t e hour became s u s p i c i o u s and c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e t o make 
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n ( T r . l l ) . Two p o l i c e m e n a p p r o a c h e d t h e p l a n e 
- 2 -
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in a patrol car with the headlights out (Tr.39). Half way 
down the airstrip before they reached the plane, the officers 
turned on the headlights and focused a spotlight on the 
plane (Tr.40) . A third officer approached the aircraft on 
foot with a flashlight in one hand and a radio in the other 
(Tr.72) . No guns were drawn on appellant (Tr.78) . Appellant . 
was neither threatened nor taken into custody (Tr.45). The 
officers did not restrict his movements or his right of speech 
in any way (Tr.45). 
Appellant was then asked for some identification; 
which he did not have (Tr.41,45). Becoming a little suspicious 
the officer asked for permission to go aboard the plane to see 
what it was carrying (Tr.45). At that point/ appellant 
voluntarily stated that the plane was loaded with "pot." The 
appellant was immediately placed under arrest and given the 
Miranda warning (Tr.52,53). 
After being told that the plane was loaded with pot# 
the officers moved closer to the aircraft and could smell the odor 
of marijuana emanating from the plane (Tr.56,76,88). In plain 
view, from outside the plane, plastic bundles could be seen 
stacked tightly to the ceiling (Exhibit Nos. 4 and 8). The lower 
court found that the statement made by appellant that "the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plane is loaded with pot" was admissible because appellant 
was not entitled to the Miranda warning. The lower court 
found that the facts of this case did not constitute a 
custodial interrogation. The lower court also held that 
the evidence was admissible because it was in plain view 
and therefore no search was necessary, and that if there 
was a search, the officers had sufficient probable cause. 
Finally, appellant was convicted of illegal pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value. ' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ACCORDING TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE MIRANDA 
WARNING WAS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION. 
The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (196 
stated: 
"The prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to 
-4-
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secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial inter-
rogation! we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way." 
In the present case, there was no custodial inter-
rogation. Therefore, the Miranda warning was not applicable. 
The officers were making a routine, general investigation. At 
the time the inquiry of appellant was made, the police officers 
had no specific crime in mind that had been committed (Tr.45). 
Appellant had not become the focus of suspicion with respect to 
any such crime (Tr.45)
 v. The appellant was not arrested, nor was 
he significantly restricted in his movements or his right of 
speech (Tr.45). Appellant was neither searched nor handcuffed 
(Tr.45) nor taken into custody. The appellant was not surrounded 
by policemen in the sense of restricting his freedom of movement. 
And at no time was a gun drawn on the appellant (Tr.78). 
The following inquiry of appellant was made: 
"Q. As you approached him did 
you have a conversation with him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was present? 
A. Deputy Laws. 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. And what time did this 
conversation take place? 
A. I would think approximately 
an hour after I received the call from 
Mr. Roper. 
Q. Possibly 4:30 or so, a.m.? 
A. I would say near 4:30, yes . 
Q. And what did you say to Mr. 
Simpson? 
A. I sa id , how are you doing? 
And I believe he s ta ted , not so good. 
Q. Did he say why? 
A. He sa id , I'm out of gas. 
Q. And what did you say? 
A. I sa id , well i t ' s kind of un-
usual being down to the end of the runway 
out of gas i s n ' t i t ? And I don ' t r e c a l l 
what he answered to t ha t . And then I 
asked him for his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . And he 
s ta ted t h a t he d idn ' t have any. And then 
I asked him for h i s p i l o t ' s l i c ense . And 
he state,d he d i d n ' t have i t . And then I 
asked i f I could please see the a i r c r a f t 
r e g i s t r a t i o n . And I don ' t r e c a l l the 
exact words on how he answered, but seems 
l ike he s ta ted , I don ' t have anything. 
Have i t or something to t h a t . " (Tr.41,42.) 
"Q. At t h i s t ime, Officer, when you 
said you'd l ike to look in the place what 
was said or done by Mr. Simpson? 
A. I s t a r t ed to step around Mr. 
Simpson and as I did he made a gesture 
with h is hand sor t of to t h i s ef fec t , and 
as he did he turned toward the airplane and 
sa id , the so and so thing i s loaded with 
pot . 
- 6 -
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Q. Well/ d id he say so and so t h i n g ? 
What did he say , do you remember? A p r o -
fane word, or do you remember the word? 
A. Well , I d o n ' t remember for sure what 
the words were to t h a t e f f e c t . 
Q. He sa id the th ing i s loaded with pot 
and you i n d i c a t e d t h a t he threw h i s hands forward 
and downward po in t ing toward the plane as he made 
the s t a t emen t? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Q. That right? What did you then do? 
A. I then advised him that he was under 
arrest for illegal possession of, I believe I 
said marijuana." (Tr.52.) 
The law in the State of Utah is clear that one is not 
entitled to notice of the Miranda warning prior to an interview 
when he is neither in custody nor deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way and where there is no evidence of 
coercion or intimidation on the part of police officers. 
In State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 
(1973) , the defendant was found guilty of murder in the second 
degree. The defendant and the victim were placed in the sama 
drunk tank. After an elapse of approximately three hours a 
deputy sheriff checked the cell and discovered the victim lying 
in a pool of blood on the floor and the defendant asleep on 
a wall bench. The officer awoke the defendant and asked him, 
-7-
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"What happened?" The defendant r e p l i e d , " I k i l l e d the son of 
a bi tch l a s t n ight ; he would not shut up." This Court held 
tha t where the defendant was not in custody for the crime of 
murder at the time he told the pol ice off icer who inquired as 
to what happened tha t he k i l l e d the victim bi^t was being 
detained on another charge, the d e f e n d a n t s statement of g u i l t 
was admiss ible despi te a lack of warnings as to the defendant 's 
r i g h t to counsel and r igh t to remain s i l e n t . 
This Court further s t a t e d : 
"The Miranda case, despi te the 
mischief i t has wrought, offers no 
aid to the defendant. Even in courts 
where i t , i s thought to be val id i t 
would not apply to the fac ts of t h i s 
case . The defendant was not in custody 
at the time for the crime of murder. 
He was being detained on another charge. 
The officer simply wanted to know what 
had occurred." 
In the present case , as in Bennett, the fac ts do not 
warrant the Miranda warning. Here, the appel lant i s not in 
custody in any way. The of f ice rs were merely making a general 
rout ine inves t iga t ion . 
- 8 -
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In State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 305, 480 P.2d 736 
(1971)
 # this Court held that the Miranda warning has no 
application when the defendant is not in custody and the stage 
of the proceedings is merely a general investigation: 
"It would be wholly impractical, 
and the law does not require an officer 
who is investigating suspicious circum-
stances to give the "Miranda" warning to 
everyone of whom he asks a question. 
The defendant and his associates were 
doing something which naturally gave rise 
to suspicion. Inquiry was therefore justi-
fied and the answer may well have disclosed 
some perfectly lawful activity. It is sig-
nificant that it does not appear that the 
officer then knew of the larceny at Brigham 
City, nor that he had any specific crime in 
mind, nor that the defendant had become the 
focus of suspicion with respect to any such 
crime. There had been no arrest or taking 
in custody, nor any significant deprivation 
of defendant's freedom. Accordingly the 
cases relied upon by the defendant have no 
application to the facts of this case; nor 
was there any invasion or disregard of his 
rights to warrant a reversal of his 
conviction." 
In the present case as in Carlsen, the appellant's 
conduct at 2:30 a.m., naturally gave rise to suspicion, which 
therefore justified an inquiry, not a custodial interrogation. 
The Court in Carlsen explained the purpose of the Miranda rule 
and said: 
-9-
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" I t is important to have in 
mind tha t these r igh t s came in to 
being as a safeguard against 
oppressive methods and abuses and 
that the i r proper appl ica t ion i s to 
serve that admittedly sa lu tary purpose. 
But the ev i l s to be guarded against 
are equaled if not surpassed if the 
protec t ions of individual r i gh t s are 
so exaggerated as to give l i cen t ious 
pro tec t ions to criminal conduct and ; 
impose such r e s t r i c t i o n s on peace 
o f f i ce r s that they cannot do an 
e f f i c i en t job of inves t iga t ing crime. 
"If i t appears tha t an accused 
has been in any way abused or imposed 
upon, unjust ly dea l t with, or unfa i r ly 
convicted, the conviction should not 
be permitted to s tand. On the other 
hand, unless there i s something of 
tha t character , those ru les should not 
be applied as mere abs t r ac t ions , apart 
from the i r reason for exis tence, to se t 
free persons p la in ly gu i l t y of crime." 
Id. a t 737. 
None of appe l l an t ' s r i g h t s have been v io la ted . 
The t r i a l court, the finder of fac t , determined tha t the facts 
of th i s case did not cons t i tu te actual or construct ive custody. 
Therefore, appellant was not e n t i t l e d to the Miranda warning. 
In l i g h t of Carlsen and Bennett, respondent respect ful ly submits 
tha t the facts of the present case do not warrant the Miranda 
warning and the decision of the lower court should be upheld. 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT I I 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM DEFENDANT'S AIRPLANE 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The F o u r t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i -
t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s o n l y t h o s e s e a r c h e s a n d s e i z u r e s w h i c h a r e 
u n r e a s o n a b l e , a n d t h i s g u a r a n t e e i s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e s t a t e s 
by r e a s o n o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment d u e p r o c e s s c l a u s e . 
S t a n f o r d v . T e x a s , 379 U . S . 4 7 6 , r e h . d e n . 380 U . S . 926 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . 
A l s o s e e S t a t e v . K e n t , 20 U t a h 2d 1 , 432 P . 2 d 64 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . 
A r t i c l e 1 , § 14 of t h e U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e same 
p r o t e c t i o n . 
S i n c e v e h i c l e s , a i r p l a n e s o r a u t o m o b i l e s , a r e 
" p e r s o n a l e f f e c t s " t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o F o u r t h Amendment p r o -
t e c t i o n . T h e s e s e a r c h e s , h o w e v e r , a r e g o v e r n e d by more l i b e r a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s t h a n t h o s e u s e d t o 
t e s t s e a r c h e s o f h o u s e s , b u i l d i n g s , e t c . , due t o t h e m o b i l i t y of 
t h e v e h i c l e . C a r r o l l v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 267 U . S . 132 ( 1 9 2 5 ) . 
A . THE EVIDENCE WAS IN PLAIN SIGHT AND OBTAINED 
WITHOUT NEED FOR A SEARCH. 
- 1 1 -
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The trial court held the stolen items obtained from 
defendant's airplane wqre in plain sight, thus not requiring 
a search for their discovery (Tr.171). 
In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 
1067, 88 S.Ct. 992 (1968) , the Supreme Court held that objects 
falling in the plain view of a police officer who has a right . 
to be in that position to have that view are not the product 
of a search, are subject to seizure, and may be introduced 
in evidence. 
This doctrine was expressed by this Court in State v. 
Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 (1972), where the facts 
revealed that defendant was placed under arrest for burglary 
and a set of automobile keys were obtained from him. A police 
officer began a search for the automobile and upon locating it, 
the officer observed in plain view in the rear of the automobile 
the stolen tape deck and tapes. The evidence was then seized 
and this Court held that where evidence was in plain view under 
plexiglass in the rear "boot" of the convertible automobile, 
there was no search and evidence was admissible in prosecution 
for burglary in the second degree. 
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Again, in State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 
535 (1964), where the facts revealed that defendant abandoned 
his car in a driveway and the investigating officer observed in 
plain view, on the front seat, stolen property, this Court held 
that no search was necessary for the officer to find the 
articles, being fully disclosed to his view as he approached • 
the car and that under such circumstances the constitutional 
guarantee is not applicable. 
In the instant case, after the defendant voluntarily 
stated that the plane was filled with pot and he was placed 
under arrest, Officers Palmer, Black, and Wright approached the 
plane. The pilot door of the airplane was open and in plain 
view they observed packages of marijuana packed very tightly 
in the airplane from the top to botton (Tr.56,75,88). The 
officers also testified that an odor which they knew to be that 
of marijuana was emanating from the airplane (Tr .56,75,88) . 
This testimony clearly places this case within the 
"plain sight" doctrine. The police officers had the right to 
be on the airstrip to conduct a general investigation after 
-13-
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b e i n g c a l l e d by t h e a i r p o r t m a n a g e r . They i n a d v e r t e n t l y saw 
a l a r g e q u a n t i t y of i l l e g a l c o n t r a b a n d . 
A l s o , i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e r e a r e e x i g e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . At 2 :30 a . m . , d i s c o v e r i n g 900 pounds of 
m a r i j u a n a , even t h o u g h t h e d e f e n d a n t was under a r r e s t i t was 
v e r y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had a c c o m p l i c e s which c o u l d 
d e s t r o y t h e e v i d e n c e . In l i g h t o f t h e s e f a c t s a p p l y i n g t h e 
p l a i n v iew d o c t r i n e t o the i n s t a n t c a s e , would be c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h U tah c a s e law of M a r t i n e z a n d A l l r e d , and t h e s t a n d a r d s 
s e t by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Cour t in H a r r i s and C o o l i d q e v . 
New Hampsh i r e , 403 U . S . 443 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . 
B . IF THERE WAS A SEARCH, IT WAS VALID ON THE BASIS 
OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t has f r e q u e n t l y 
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i f l aw en fo rcemen t o f f i c e r s have p r o b a b l e c a u s e 
fo r s e a r c h i n g a mob i l e v e h i c l e , s u c h p r o b a b l e c a u s e f u r n i s h e d 
s u f f i c i e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e i r s e a r c h i n g the 
v e h i c l e w i t h o u t o b t a i n i n g a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . C a r r o l l v . U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , s u p r a : 
- 1 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The measure of l ega l i t y of 
such a seizure i s . . . t h a t the 
seizing off icer sha l l have reason-
able or probable cause for believing 
that the auto which he stops and 
seizes has contraband l iquor therein 
which i s i l l e g a l l y t ranspor ted ." 
Another United Sta tes Supreme Court case supporting 
th i s view i s Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419,. 
90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970), which held tha t a warrant less search was 
proper based on probable cause. The occupants of the vehicle 
were arrested and the search was conducted at the police s t a t ion 
without a warrant af ter the suspected armed occupants of the 
car were j a i l e d . In the decis ion, the Court l a id down an 
important guidel ine for lower courts to follow: 
"For cons t i tu t iona l purposes, 
we see no difference between on the 
one hand seizing and holding a car 
before present ing the probable cause 
issue to a magistrate and on the other 
hand carrying out an immediate search 
without a warrant. Given probable cause 
to search, e i the r course i s reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment." 
When the off icers arr ived, they asked the defendant 
for some iden t i f i ca t ion which he did not have (Tr.42). When 
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t h e o f f i c e r s a s k e d t h e d e f e n d a n t i f t h e y c o u l d go a b o a r d t h e 
p l a n e , t h e d e f e n d a n t v o l u n t e e r e d t h a t t h e p l a n e was l o a d e d 
w i t h " p o t " (Tr .52 ) . The o f f i c e r s a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e s m e l l 
o f m a r i j u a n a was e m a n a t i n g from the a i r p l a n e and t h a t i n p l a i n 
v i e w t h e y c o u l d see pa c ka ge s s t a c k e d t o t h e c e i l i n g which 
from p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e r e p r e s e n t e d m a r i j u a n a . 
The above f a c t s a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s 
had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o s e a r c h d e f e n d a n t ' s a i r p l a n e . The " a u t o -
m o b i l e e x c e p t i o n " t o a w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h i s b a s e d on i t s m o b i l i t y 
and t h r e a t of l o s i n g t h e e v i d e n c e . In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e 
o f f i c e r s were d e a l i n g w i t h a h i g h l y m o b i l e v e h i c l e . T h i s f a c t o r 
combined w i t h p r o b a b l e c a u s e j u s t i f i e s t h e s e a r c h by t h e o f f i c e r s . 
C . IF THERE WAS A SEARCH, IT WAS VALID AS INCIDENT 
TO ARREST. 
An e x c e l l e n t r e v i e w of t h e l aw on t h i s s u b j e c t i s 
g i v e n i n P r e s t o n v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 376 U . S . 364 , 11 L . E d . 7 7 7 , 
84 S . C t . 881 ( 1 9 6 4 ) : 
"Unquestionably, when a person 
is lawfully arrested, the police have 
the right, without a search warrant, 
to make a contemporaneous search of 
the person of the accused for weapons 
or for the fruits of or implements used 
to commit the crime. Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) . This 
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r igh t to search and seize without 
a warrant has been extended to things 
under the accused's immediate cont ro l , 
Carrol l v . United S ta tes , supra 267 
U.S. a t 158, and to an extent , depending 
on the circumstances of t he case, to the 
p lace where he i s a r res ted , Agnello v. 
United S ta tes , supra 269 U.S. a t 307 
Marron v . United S ta tes , 275 U.S. 192, 
199 (1927); United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1950). The ru l e 
allowing contemporaneous searches i s 
j u s t i f i e d for example, by the need . . . 
to prevent the des t ruc t ion of evidence 
of the crime. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
Preston also expressed a t e s t for determining the scope 
of a search incident to a r r e s t . I t cannot be remote in time or 
place from the a r r e s t . 
Case law defines what i s reasonably contemporaneous 
in time and place with an a r r e s t . In Sta te v . McClung, 66 Wash.2d 
654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965), a search of defendant 's automobile-, 
across the s t r ee t and l e s s than 150 feet from the tavern in which 
defendant was a r res ted was held val id as incidental to an a r r e s t , 
and not too remote in time and p lace . In Scott v . People, 166 
Colo. 432, 444 P.2d 388 (1967), the inspection of an unoccupied 
automobile parked about one-half block from the scene of the crime 
was held to be a reasonable search incident to a r r e s t . People 
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v. F e l l i , 156 C.A.2d 123# 318 P.2d 840 (19.57), held tha t where 
off icers a r res ted defendant while he was driving his automobile, 
locked the vehic le and took defendant to pol ice headquarters for 
booking, and had the vehicle towed to the place of storage before 
commencing the i r search (within an hour a f te r a r r e s t ) , was l ega l 
as incident to a r r e s t . • 
In the present case, defendant was a r res ted between 
the plane and the police c a r . The police car was approximately 
35 feet away from the p lane . In l igh t of the previously c i ted 
au thor i ty , respondent submits the above facts coupled with the 
pos s ib i l i t y t h a t the evidence might have been removed or destroyed 
by accomplices show tha t the search was reasonably incident to 
a r r e s t . 
' POINT I I I 
THE LOWER COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO PUNISH THE 
APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1973), provides: 
"(1) A person is subject to 
prosecution in this state for an offense 
which he commits, whi le either within or 
-18-
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outside the state, by his own conduct 
or that of another for which he is 
legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed 
either wholly or partly within the 
state; or 
(b) The conduct outside the state 
constitutes an attempt to commit an 
offense within the state; or 
(c) The conduct outside the state 
constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs 
in the state; or 
(d) The conduct within the 
state constitutes an attempt, solicita-
tion, or conspiracy to commit in another 
jurisdiction an offense under the laws of 
both this state and such other jurisdic-
tion. 
(2) An offense is committed partly 
within this state if either the conduct 
which is' an element of the offense, or 
the result which is such an element, 
occurs within this state. . . ."' 
The lower court ruled that it had jurisdiction, 
based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1973). Respondent 
submits the facts of this case fit within the parameters of 
that statute but recognize that this Court has not yet inter-
preted this particular statutory provision. Thus, it is 
essential to rely on the authority of other jurisdictions. 
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California has a s imilar s t a t u t e which provides: 
"The following persons are 
l i a b l e to punishment under the 
laws of t h i s s t a t e : 
1. All persons who commit, in 
whole or in pa r t , any crime within 
t h i s s t a t e ; 
2. All who commit any offense 
without t h i s s t a t e which, if com-
mitted within th i s s t a t e , would be 
larceny, robbery, embezzlement 
under the laws of t h i s s t a t e , and bring 
the property s tolen or embezzled, or any 
par t of i t , or are found with i t , or any 
par t of i t , within th is s t a t e ; 
3 . All who, being without t h i s s t a t e , 
cause or aid, advise or encourage, 
another person to commit a crime within 
t h i s s t a t e , and are afterwards found 
there in . " Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 27(1). 
In People v. Ut ter , 24 Cal.App.3d 535, 101 Cal .Rptr . 
214 (1972), the defendant was convicted of robbery and grand 
thef t in Cal i fornia . The only act conducted in California was 
that of possession of some s to len jewelry. The Court held: 
"Sta tutes providing that a l l 
persons who commit, in whole or in 
pa r t , any crime within s t a t e are 
l i a b l e to punishment under laws of 
s t a t e and t h a t , whenever a person, 
with attempt to commit a crime, does 
any act within s t a t e in execution or 
part execution of such in t en t , 
culminating in commission of a crime, 
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e i the r within or without s t a t e , such 
person i s punishable for such crime 
in s t a t e in same manner as if crime 
had been committed en t i r e ly within 
s t a t e require the doing of an act 
within s t a t e amounting to an "attempt" 
t o commit offense charged, within 
def in i t ion of attempt in criminal cases 
general ly , tha t i s , an act beyond mere 
prepara t ion ." 
In the ins tant case the defendant went past the 
stage of mere preparat ion, and was in the act of t ranspor t ing 
900 pounds of marijuana. 
In another California case, People v. Case, 49 Cal.2d 
24, 313 P.2d 840 (1957), the defendant was convicted of grand 
t h e f t . The only act cQmmitted in California was de fendan t s 
possession of the s to len money. Again, the Court held tha t the 
defendant who s to le the money in another s t a t e and brought i t 
into California where he was charged with grand thef t was 
properly charged in the information which al leged that larceny 
was committed within California and the Superior Court had j u r i s -
d i c t ion to t r y and convict the defendant of the offense upon 
evidence showing o r ig ina l unlawful taking of money by the 
defendant somewhere outside of the s t a t e and upon the showing of 
unlawful character of the de fendan t s possession of the money 
within the s t a t e of Cal i forn ia . 
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Respondent maintains that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201, 
supra, is clearly applicable to the facts of this case giving 
the district court jurisdiction to convict the defendant of 
the crime charged in the information. 
In the instant case, defendant was in possession of 
900 pounds of marijuana. The marijuana was packed in bundles 
containing about 10 individual packages (Tr.91). The defendant 
testified that he was to receive ten thousand dollars in 
compensation (Tr.123). It is well settled law that distribu-7 
tion for value or sale of narcotics can be determined from 
possession, quantity, and manner in which the substance is packed. 
State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 803 (1973) 7 State v. 
Arce, 107 Ariz. 156, 483 P.2d 1395 (1971). 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (A) (11) 
(Supp. 1973), states that the prosecution must prove that appel-
lant had an intent to distribute a controlled substance "in Utah." 
Appellant1s brief misrepresents this statute. Respondent submits 
that in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1973), 
the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State contends that the facts of this case do 
not constitute a custodial interrogation; therefore, the 
Miranda rule is inapplicable. The State further contends 
that there are three theories under which the evidence obtained 
from defendants airplane can be deemed admissible. 
• First, the evidence was in plain sight and obtained 
without a search. Second, if there was a search, it was valid 
on the basis of probable cause. Third, if there was a search, it 
was valid as incident to a lawful arrest. Finally, the district 
court for Utah does have jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-201 (Supp. 1973) . 
For the above reasons the respondent respectfully 
requests that the conviction of the defendant for illegal pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value be affirmed. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B . ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL F . DORIUS 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
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